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Abstract
Providing security guarantees for wireless communication is critically important for today’s applications. While
previous work in this area has concentrated on radio frequency (RF) channels, providing security guarantees for RF
channels is inherently difficult because they are prone to rapid variations due small scale fading. Wireless optical
communication, on the other hand, is inherently more secure than RF communication due to the intrinsic aspects
of the signal propagation in the optical and near-optical frequency range. In this paper, secure communication over
wireless optical links is examined by studying the secrecy capacity of a direct detection system. For the degraded
Poisson wiretap channel, a closed-form expression of the secrecy capacity is given. A complete characterization of
the general rate-equivocation region is also presented. For achievability, an optimal code is explicitly constructed by
using the structured code designed by Wyner for the Poisson channel. The converse is proved in two different ways:
the first method relies only on simple properties of the conditional expectation and basic information theoretical
inequalities, whereas the second method hinges on the recent link established between minimum mean square
estimation and mutual information in Poisson channels.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
PROTECTING information flow from unauthorized access is of vital importance for today’s applications.The concept of information secrecy however is not new and dates back to the pioneering work of Shannon
[1]. Shannon considered a strong notion of secrecy requiring essentially that the eavesdropper’s received signal be
independent of the communicated message. Under this constraint Shannon showed that the transmitter must share
a private key with the legitimate receiver whose entropy is at least as large as the message’s entropy. This negative
result lead to the development of modern cryptographic systems whose objective is not to provide strong secrecy
but rather to make security breaches computationally prohibitive. These encryption algorithms are employed today
in most systems where secrecy is required. This wide deployment, however, should not obscure the fact that these
methods do not offer strong security guarantees. Information-theoretical security can provide such guarantees and
as such has attracted considerable attention lately.
The pessimistic result of Shannon is due to the implicit assumption that the eavesdropper observes the same
signal as the legitimate receiver. In his celebrated paper [2], Wyner challenged this assumption by introducing
the wiretap channel, a channel in which an eavesdropper observes a degraded version of the signal received by
the legitimate receiver. Wyner also considered a different notion of secrecy which requires that asymptotically the
equivocation of the eavesdropper about the transmitted message should converge to the message’s entropy. With this
new framework, and for discrete memoryless channels (DMCs), Wyner gave a complete description of the tradeoff
between the information rate at the legitimate receiver and the information leaked to the eavesdropper. Wyner
showed that for a DMC there exists an intrinsic quantity called the secrecy capacity which gives the maximum
information rate that can be reliably transmitted to the legitimate receiver with zero leakage of information to the
eavesdropper. Since then, the wiretap channel has become one of the core topics in information theoretic security
and several results are available today. Csiszar and Korner [3] extended Wyner’s study to nondegraded DMCs. The
degraded Gaussian wiretap channel was studied in [4]. Multiple input multiple output (MIMO) Gaussian wiretap
channels have been the subject of an extensive interest lately [5]-[7]. Wiretap channels in the presence of fading
have been also investigated in [8]-[9] (and the references therein).
The results of [3] show that a non-zero secrecy capacity requires that the legitimate receiver’s channel be less noisy
3than the eavesdropper’s. For RF channels, however, this is difficult to guarantee in practice due to the possibility
of multipath fading. Indeed, even if the legitimate receiver is closer to the transmitter than the eavesdropper is, the
legitimate receiver may still have a weaker channel due to fading. Moreover, since the fading state is a sensitive
function of the position of the receivers, it is difficult to predict the degree of fading experienced by the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper given imperfect information about their locations.
One possible solution to this problem is to use optical or near-optical frequencies instead of RF. For optical
wireless systems, the detector is usually multiple orders of magnitude larger than the wavelength of the transmitted
beam, which provides natural immunity against multipath fading via spatial diversity [10]. This immunity makes
predictions about the quality of the legitimate receiver’s and the eavesdropper’s signal based on their position more
accurate. In fact, with the multipath problem gone, the only major channel impairment remaining is the pathloss
which can be safely assumed to be higher for the eavesdropper if the legitimate receiver can guarantee that he is
closer to the transmitter.
Another advantage of optical communications over RF is that the transmitted signal is highly directional, making
interception by a malevolent third party more difficult. This should be contrasted with the relatively-omnidirectional
nature of RF transmissions, for which the signal is broadcasted over a wide angle. Yet another advantage of wireless
optical communication is the spatial confinement of the transmitted optical signal. Indeed, at optical wavelengths,
the transmitted signal is absorbed by the atmosphere and beyond a certain range it becomes undetectable. This is
desirable from a security standpoint as an eavesdropper located beyond this range is literally kept in the dark.
All of these features give wireless optical communications a clear advantage for security. This technology is
already being deployed in the form of infrared communications [11]-[12], and ultraviolet (UV) systems are currently
under development [13]-[14]. However, despite the numerous benefits that this technology offers, coding is still
needed for those scenarios in which the channel itself does not provide absolute secrecy, such as when the beam
of light is reflected or scattered by solid objects, dust or water droplets [15]. Although in this case the signal has
been degraded, an eavesdropper could still gain valuable information.
We examine the fundamental limits of coding for secure communication over optical channels by studying the
secrecy capacity of the Poisson channel, a common model for direct detection optical communications systems. In
4such systems the transmitter sends information by modulating the intensity of an optical signal while the receiver
observes the arrival moments of individual photons. The capacity of this channel has been determined under
peak power constraint on the transmitted optical power by Kabanov [16] and under both average and peak power
constraint by Davis [17]. Wyner [18] derived the reliability function of this channel for all rates below capacity
and constructed exponentially optimal codes. Multiple-access Poisson channels were studied in [19]-[20] whereas
broadcast Poisson channels were considered in [21] and [22]. The capacity of the Poisson channel has been also
investigated in the presence of fading [23].
We study in this paper the degraded Poisson wiretap channel. The legitimate receiver observes a doubly stochastic
Poisson process with instantaneous rate AyXt + λy where {Xt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T} is the signal transmitted. The
eavesdropper’s observation is also a doubly stochastic Poisson process with instantaneous rate AzXt + λz . For
degradedness we assume that1 Ay ≥ Az and λy ≤ AyAz λz . In Theorem 1 we provide a closed form expression of the
secrecy capacity as a function of the parameters (Au, λu), u ∈ {y, z}. This result is further extended by Theorem
5 which gives a full characterization of the rate equivocation region.
Our achievability proof uses stochastic encoding as well as the structured codes constructed by Wyner for the
Poisson channel [18]. As for the converse, we will see that the infinite bandwidth nature of the Poisson channel
makes it possible to prove the converse using only simple properties of the conditional expectation combined
with basic information theoretical inequalities. This is to be contrasted with the converse of the (finite bandwidth)
Gaussian channel which is proved using the entropy power inequality (EPI). As an illustration for the basic ideas that
underpin the converse for the Poisson channel, we will start by considering here the more familiar infinite bandwidth
Gaussian channel and we will see also that for this channel the proof of the converse simplifies considerably.
For this purpose, consider the continuous time Gaussian wiretap channel with bandwidth B (later we will let B
tend to infinity) and with a power constraint P . This continuous time channel is equivalent to 2B uses per second
of the discrete time Gaussian channel depicted in Fig. 1. The input signal is power constrained, i.e., E[X2] ≤ P ,
the legitimate receiver observes Y = X +W1 and the eavesdropper receives Z = Y +W2 = X +W1+W2, where
Wi ∼ N (0, NiB) and W1 ⊥⊥W2.
1These conditions were shown to be sufficient for degradedness in [21]. The argument is reproduced in Lemma 1 below.
5+ +
PSfrag replacements
W2
ZX
W1
Y
Fig. 1. The discrete time Gaussian wiretap channel
Define N˜ by 1
N˜
= 1
N1
− 1
N1+N2
and observe that
N˜
N1
Y = X +
N1
N2
Z + W˜ , (1)
where W˜ =W1− N1N2W2. It is easy to see that W˜ ∼ N (0, N˜B) and E[W˜ (W1+W2)] = 0, it follows therefore that
W˜ ⊥⊥W1+W2 (since they are jointly Gaussian). For the discrete time Gaussian wiretap channel, it is known that
the secrecy capacity is given by maxpX (I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z)). For the continuous time channel counterpart with
bandwidth B, the secrecy capacity becomes CBs = 2BmaxpX (I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)).
In [4], using the celebrated EPI, a closed form expression for the secrecy capacity of the discrete time Gaussian
wiretap channel was obtained. In just a few steps, we will see that the secrecy capacity of the infinite bandwidth
(B → ∞) Gaussian wiretap channel can be found much more simply. Starting with (1) we obtain the following
sequence of inequalities
I(X;Y ) = I(X;X +
N1
N2
Z + W˜ )
(a)
≤ I(X;X + W˜ , Z)
(b)
= h(X + W˜ , Z)− h(X + W˜ , Z|X)
(c)
≤ h(X + W˜ ) + h(Z)− h(X + W˜ , Z|X)
(d)
= h(X + W˜ ) + h(Z)− h(X + W˜ |X) − h(Z|X)
(e)
= I(X;X + W˜ ) + I(X;Z),
Inequality (a) follows from the data processing inequality, equalities in (b) and (e) are standard information
theory identities, (c) follows from the independence bound on entropy and finally (d) holds because X + W˜ and
X+W1+W2 are conditionally independent given X (i.e., (X+W˜ ) ⊥⊥ (X+W1+W2)|X). Basically, the key identity
needed to go from (a) to (e) is the following: if Y1 ⊥⊥ Y2|X, then we have I(X;Y1, Y2) ≤ I(X;Y1)+ I(X;Y2). A
6proof of this simple inequality in a more general setting will be given later and will be used in part of the converse
for the Poisson channel. Going back to the Gaussian problem, we see that
CBs = 2Bmax
PX
(I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)) ≤ 2Bmax
PX
I(X;X + W˜ ) = B ln(1 +
P
BN˜
). (2)
For a fixed bandwidth B, this last inequality is not tight. Now letting B →∞ we obtain
C∞s , lim
B→∞
CBs ≤
P
N˜
=
P
N1
−
P
N1 +N2
. (3)
However, since maxpX (I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)) ≥ maxpX I(X;Y )−maxpX I(X;Z), we also have that
C∞s ≥ lim
B→∞
(
B ln(1 +
P
BN1
)−B ln(1 +
P
B(N1 +N2)
)
)
=
P
N1
−
P
N1 +N2
. (4)
It follows that C∞s = PN1 −
P
N1+N2
.
This remarkably simple approach will be particularly useful for the Poisson channel. More specifically, when
λy
Ay
= λz
Az
, the eavesdropper’s signal Z is a thinned version of the legitimate receiver’s signal Y , i.e., 2 Y = Z + Z˜
where Z ⊥⊥ Z˜|X, the approach above gives that I(X;Y )−I(X;Z) ≤ I(X; Z˜). Since Z˜ is itself a doubly stochastic
Poisson process, the mutual information I(X; Z˜) can be maximized using the martingale techniques of Kabanov
[16] and an (achievable) upperbound can be obtained on I(X;Y )− I(X;Z). When λy
Ay
< λz
Az
, a different bounding
technique using only simple properties of the conditional expectation will be devised.
Although no “sophisticated” tools are required to prove the converse, we show in the appendix that using some
new results in information theory an alternative proof can be provided. This different proof hinges on the link that
has been established between the mutual information (MI) and the minimum mean square estimation (MMSE) in
Poisson channels [24]. It is worth noting at this point that the link between the MI and the MMSE in the Gaussian
setting [25] has been also used recently for different Gaussian wiretap channels [26], [27].
One of the distinctive aspects in this paper is that we do not resort to the ∆-discretization method introduced
by Wyner [18]. This method was used to approximate the Poisson channel by a binary DMC thereby allowing
the transposition of the widely known results for DMCs to the Poisson channel. This technique leads to extensive
computations, especially when we are interested in the secrecy capacity as there are now two conflicting objectives
2The time dependence has been dropped to ease the notations. Refer to the converse part of the paper for a mathematically precise
statement.
7involved, the maximization of the information rate at the legitimate receiver and the minimization of the information
leakage at the eavesdropper. We circumvent the use of this method by using the techniques described above.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the setup of the problem and presents
the main result of this paper as well as some interpretations of the obtained result. The proof of the achievability
of the secrecy capacity is given in Section III and the proof of the converse is presented in Section IV. In Section
V we extend the main result of the paper by giving a complete characterization of the rate-equivocation region.
Finally, in section VI, some possible future directions are discussed.
II. PROBLEM AND RESULT STATEMENT
The input process to the Poisson channel is a waveform denoted by XT0 , {Xt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T} satisfying Xt ≥ 0
for all t. We further assume that the input process is peak power limited, i.e., Xt ≤ 1 for all t. The received signal
at the legitimate receiver Y T0 is a doubly stochastic Poisson process with instantaneous rate AyXt + λy , i.e., given
XT0 the stochastic process Y T0 has independent increments with Y0 = 0 and for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T we have
Pr(Yt − Ys = k|X
T
0 ) =
1
k!
Υk(s, t)e−Υ(s,t), k ∈ N,
where
Υ(s, t) =
∫ t
s
(AyXτ + λy)dτ.
The parameter Ay > 0 accounts for possible signal attenuation at the receiver. The parameter λy ≥ 0 is the dark
current intensity which results from background noise and bears no information on the input process XT0 . Similarly
the output process of the eavesdropper ZT0 is a doubly stochastic Poisson process with instantaneous rate AzXt+λz .
In this paper, the space of doubly stochastic Poisson processes on the interval [0, T ] will be denoted by P(T ).
Following the notation used in [24] the output process of the Poisson channel in the interval [0, T ] with instantaneous
rate αXt + λ will be denoted by PT0 (αXT0 + λ). We use 〈Xt〉s to designate E[Xt|Ps0(Xs0)], as such 〈Xt〉t refers
to the causal conditional mean estimate and 〈Xt〉T to the noncausal one.
All stochastic processes considered in this paper are defined on a common measurable space (Ω,F). We use Fsξ
to denote the internal history generated by the process ξs0.
8In this paper we are interested in the degraded Poisson wiretap channel. Lapidoth et al. [21] gave conditions on
the parameters (Au, λu), u ∈ {y, z} for stochastic degradedness. These conditions are presented in the following
lemma. In order to prepare for the results to come we will also briefly go over the proof of this lemma.
Lemma 1 (Lapidoth, Telatar and Urbanke [21]). The eavesdropper’s channel is stochastically degraded with re-
spect to the legitimate receiver’s channel, if
Ay ≥ Az, (5)
and
λy ≤
Ay
Az
λz. (6)
Proof: Let Y˜ T0 (cf. Fig. 2) be the process defined as follows
Y˜t = Yt +Ht, t ∈ [0, T ], (7)
where Ht is a homogeneous Poisson process with rate λ˜ = AyAz λz − λy (note that λ˜ ≥ 0 by (6)) independent of
(XT0 , Y
T
0 ). It follows that Y˜ T0 is a doubly stochastic Poisson process with instantaneous rate AyXt + λy + λ˜ =
AyXt +
Ay
Az
λz . The process ZT0 is then obtained from Y˜ T0 by thinning with erasure probability 1 − AzAy (note that
because of (5) this quantity is ≥ 0).
In the rest of this paper we will assume that at least one of the inequalities (5) or (6) is strict. Note that this
assumption can be made without losing generality for if there was an equality in (5) and (6) then the legitimate
receiver’s channel and the eavesdropper’s channel will be identical and the secrecy capacity will be zero.
+
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Fig. 2. The degraded Poisson wiretap channel
We move now to the description of the information transmission aspect of the problem. The transmitter wishes
to communicate a message U uniformly distributed on U = {1, ...,M}. An (M,T ) code (ET ,DT ) for the Poisson
wiretap channel is a stochastic encoder ET that maps a message U to a waveform XT0 which satisfies the peak
9power constraint and a decoder DT : P(T )→ U . The transmission rate of this code is
R =
H(U)
T
=
1
T
lnM.
The average probability of error at the legitimate receiver is
Pe =
1
M
M∑
m=1
Pr
(
DT (Y
T
0 ) 6= m|U = m
)
. (8)
The level of secrecy in this paper is measured by 1
T
I(U ;ZT0 ). This normalized mutual information quantifies the
amount of information about the message U leaked to the eavesdropper. As such our goal is to make this quantity
as small as possible.
Definition A secrecy rate Rs is said to be achievable for the Poisson wiretap channel if for all ǫ > 0 and all
sufficiently large T , there exists an (M,T ) code such that
lnM
T
≥ Rs − ǫ
Pe ≤ ǫ
1
T
I(U ;ZT0 ) ≤ ǫ (9)
The supremum of achievable secrecy rates will be called the secrecy capacity. The main result of this paper is the
following.
Theorem 1. The secrecy capacity of the degraded Poisson wiretap channel is given by3
Cs = α
∗(Ay −Az) + ln
(
λ
λy
y
λλzz
)
+ ln
(
(Azα
∗ + λz)
λz
(Ayα∗ + λy)λy
)
, (10)
where α∗ is the unique solution in [0, 1] to the following equation
(Ayα
∗ + λy)
Ay
(Azα∗ + λz)Az
= eAz−Ay
(Ay + λy)
Ay+λy
(Az + λz)Az+λz
λλzz
λ
λy
y
. (11)
This result assumes that (Az, λz) is known to the transmitter. Yet it follows that Cs is an achievable rate with
perfect secrecy even if the eavesdropper observes PT0 (A′zXT0 + λ′z), where A′z and λ′z are unknown but satisfy
A′z ≤ Az and λ′z ≥
A′z
Az
λz . Thus, only one-sided estimates of Az and λz are needed. In practice, an upper bound on
Az could be provided by guaranteeing that any potential eavesdropper is more than a certain distance away from
3If λ = 0, the convention is that 00 = 1.
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the transmitter. A lower bound on the dark current λz could be provided using ambient noise measurements and
the known physical limitations of existing receivers.
Worst case scenario: A particularly insightful case is when λy
Ay
= λz
Az
= σ. This situation happens when the
eavesdropper observes a thinned version of the signal of the legitimate receiver, i.e., Ht ≡ 0 in (7). In this case,
after some algebraic manipulations, we obtain that
α∗ =
(1 + σ)1+σ
eσσ
− σ, (12)
and the secrecy capacity reduces to
Cs = (λy − λz)
(
1
e
(
1 +
1
σ
)1+σ
− (1 + σ) ln
(
1 +
1
σ
))
. (13)
This is saying that the secrecy capacity is the difference between the capacity of the main channel (the channel
between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver) and the capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel. For instance, in
the special case when there is no dark current λy = λz = 0, we find that α∗ = 1e and the secrecy capacity reduces
to
Cs =
Ay −Az
e
. (14)
For a degraded DMC, Wyner [2] showed that the secrecy capacity is equal to maxpX (I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)). Hence
the following inequality is always satisfied
Secrecy Capacity ≥ CM − CW ,
where CM is the capacity of the main channel and CW is the capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel. As shown
in [28], there is equality in the inequality above if there is an input probability distribution pX that maximizes
simultaneously I(X;Y ) and I(X;Z). This is exactly what is happening here, when λy
Ay
= λz
Az
the mutual information
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 ) and I(XT0 ;ZT0 ) are both maximized by letting the input XT0 cycle infinitely fast between its extreme
values, i.e., the peak power 1 and 0 with Pr(Xt = 1) = 1− Pr(Xt = 0) = α∗ = (1+σ)
1+σ
eσσ
− σ.
Before we proceed further with the presentation of the problem considered in this paper, we give a lemma that
will prove to be useful in the proofs of the achievability and the converse, a proof of this result can be found for
instance in [16].
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Lemma 2. The mutual information between the input XT0 and the output PT0 (αXT0 + λ) can be upper bounded as
follows4
I(XT0 ;P
T
0 (αX
T
0 + λ)) ≤
∫ T
0
(E[ϑ(Xt)]− ϑ(E[Xt]))dt, (15)
where ϑ(x) = (αx+ λ) ln(αx+ λ).
III. ACHIEVABILITY OF Cs
Our achievability proof relies on the structured codes that were designed for the Poisson channel by Wyner
[18]. Before delving into the details of the proof, we will briefly describe the code construction and the properties
inherited by this code.
Wyner codes W(T,M, k): Let T , M and k be given, and construct an M ×
(
M
k
)
binary matrix X as follows.
The columns of X are the
(
M
k
)
binary M -vectors with exactly k ones and M − k zeros. Now partition the interval
[0, T ] into
(
M
k
)
subintervals of equal length ̟T , T(M
k
)
and construct M waveforms {XT0 (m)}Mm=1 as follows
Xt(m) = X (m,n), t ∈ ((n − 1)̟T , n̟T ], n = 1, ...,
(
M
k
)
. (16)
For α = k
M
fixed, these codes satisfy
1
T
µ{t : Xt(m) = 1} = α, for all m, (17)
with µ being the Lebesgue measure. If moreover M = eRT , for T >> 1, Wyner showed that for m 6= m′
1
T
µ{t : Xt(m) = 1,Xt(m
′) = 0} ≈ α(1− α). (18)
As such for T large enough the codewords {XT0 (m)}Mm=1 will behave as if they were chosen independently.
After this brief overview of Wyner codes we are in a position to state the achievability theorem and prove it.
Theorem 2. Any secrecy rate Rs < Cs is achievable.
Proof: Let ǫ > 0 be arbitrary and let Rs = Cs − ǫ. Define
Ru = α
∗(Au + λu) ln(Au + λu) + (1− α
∗)λu lnλu
− (Auα
∗ + λu) ln(Auα
∗ + λu), u ∈ {y, z}. (19)
4Note that some authors use the function ϑ(x) = (αx+ λ) ln(αx+ λ)− λ lnλ instead but the constant term λ lnλ cancels out here.
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After few algebraic manipulations, we can show that
Cs = Ry −Rz.
Given these parameters, the encoder-decoder pair considered here works as follows.
Encoding: Let M = eRsT and let U be uniformly distributed on U = {1, ...,M}. Define My = e(Ry−
3
2
ǫ)T and
following the steps described above construct a code5 C =W(T,My, α∗My). Partition this code arbitrarily into M
smaller subcodes, i.e., C = ∪Mi=1Ci. The cardinality of each each subcode Ci will be equal to Mz =
My
M
= e(Rz−
ǫ
2
)T
.
The encoder works as follows, when the message U = m is chosen, the codeword XT0 is selected uniformly
randomly from Cm.
Decoding: The decoder considered here is the maximum likelihood decoder constructed by Wyner [18]. After
observing Y T0 , the decoder at the legitimate receiver computes the following metric
Ψm =
∫
Sm
dYt, (20)
where Sm = {t ∈ [0, T ] : Xt(m) = 1}. Then DT (Y T0 ) = m if m maximizes Ψm, with ties resolved in favor of
the smallest m.
Analysis of Pe: The fact that Pe → 0, follows simply from the fact that Wyner codes with the peak power 1
and average power α∗ are capacity achieving.
Analysis of 1
T
I(U ;ZT0 ):
Notice first that for each m, the waveform XT0 (m) is piecewise constant. It follows that a sufficient statistic for
making a decision is the number of arrivals during each subinterval ((n−1)̟T , n̟T ], i.e., Zn = Zn̟T −Z(n−1)̟T ,
n = 1, ..., Ny with Ny =
(
My
α∗My
)
. Consequently,
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 ) = I(X;Z)
I(U ;ZT0 ) = I(U ;Z) (21)
where X = [X1, ...,XNy ], Xi = 0 or 1 depending on the choice of the codeword and Z = [Z1, ..., ZNy ]. The
equalities above follows from the fact that Z is a sufficient statistic.
5Note that even if α∗ is not a rational number, it can be approximated arbitrary close by rationals.
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As a result of Lemma 2, we have
1
T
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 ) ≤
1
T
∫ T
0
(E[φz(Xt)]− φz(E[Xt]))dt, (22)
where φz(x) = (Azx+ λz) ln(Azx+ λz). Because of the uniform choice in the encoding scheme and in view of
(17) we must have that Pr[Xt = 1] = 1− Pr[Xt = 0] = α∗, hence we have
E[φz(Xt)] = α
∗φz(1) + (1− α
∗)φz(0)
= α∗(Az + λz) ln(Az + λz) + (1− α
∗)λz lnλz. (23)
and
φz(E[Xt]) = φz(α
∗) = (Azα
∗ + λz) ln(Azα
∗ + λz). (24)
Consequently, we deduce that
1
T
I(X;Z) =
1
T
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 ) ≤ Rz. (25)
Notice that every subcode Cm can be viewed as a code for the eavesdropper’s channel with Mz codewords and
uniform prior distribution. Define δm to be the probability of error for code Cm (1 ≤ m ≤M ) with the (optimal)
decoder described above and let δ = 1
M
∑M
m=1 δm. From Fano’s inequality we have
H(X|Z, U = m) ≤ H(δm) + δm lnMz, (26)
where H(p) = −p ln(p)− (1− p) ln(1− p) is the binary entropy.
Since the codewords are uniformly distributed in each subcode, we deduce that H(X|U = m) = lnMz . We
conclude therefore that
I(X;Z|U = m) = H(X|U = m)−H(X|Z, U = m)
≥ lnMz − (H(δm) + δm lnMz). (27)
Averaging over U and by using the concavity of H(·) we find that
I(X;Z|U) ≥ lnMz − (H(δ) + δ lnMz). (28)
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Notice also that U → X→ Z form a Markov chain, i.e.,
1
T
I(U ;Z) =
1
T
I(U,X;Z) −
1
T
I(X;Z|U)
=
1
T
I(X;Z)−
1
T
I(X;Z|U) (29)
Combined with the last inequality this implies that
1
T
I(U ;Z) ≤
1
T
I(X;Z)−
1
T
lnMz +
1
T
(H(δ) + δ lnMz). (30)
Inequalities (25) and (30) result in the following
1
T
I(U ;Z) ≤ Rz −
1
T
[lnMz − (H(δ) + δ lnMz)]. (31)
As Mz = e(Rz−
ǫ
2
)T
, this gives
1
T
I(U ;ZT0 ) =
1
T
I(U ;Z) ≤
ǫ
2
+
1
T
H(δ) + δ(Rz −
ǫ
2
). (32)
By the code construction described above, the codewords of every subcode Cm (1 ≤ m ≤M ) satisfy (17) and (18)
(with α replaced by α∗). These two conditions dictate the pairwise error probability of the codewords in Cm [18].
Since the overall error probability of the code Cm is governed by the pairwise error probability [18], it follows that
every subcode Cm is capacity achieving for the eavesdropper’s channel and as such δm for m = 1, ...,M can be
made arbitrarily small. Hence, by choosing T large enough, we can enforce that 1
T
H(δ) + δ(Rz −
ǫ
2 ) ≤
ǫ
2 . The
previous inequality shows therefore that 1
T
I(U ;ZT0 ) ≤ ǫ and the desired secrecy condition is satisfied.
This shows that any secrecy rate Rs < Cs can be achieved and completes the achievability proof.
IV. THE CONVERSE FOR THE SECRECY CAPACITY
Before delving into the details of the converse we need the following technical lemma due to Wyner [29].
Lemma 3 (Wyner [29]). If Γ : Ω→ ̥ is a random variable such that ̥ is a finite set and ΛT0 = {Λt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T} is
a given stochastic process, then we have
I(Γ; ΛT0 ) = H(Γ)−H(Γ|Λ
T
0 ), (33)
where H(Γ) is the usual entropy for discrete random variables and
H(Γ|ΛT0 ) = −E
[∑
γ∈̥
Pr[Γ = γ|FTΛ ] ln Pr[Γ = γ|F
T
Λ ]
]
. (34)
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This lemma is standard when all the random variables have discrete alphabets however this extension is needed in
this paper since we are dealing with continuous time stochastic processes.
The converse theorem will be proved through a sequence of Lemmas. The first one gives an inequality that must
satisfied by every encoder-decoder pair (ET ,DT ).
Lemma 4. For every (M,T ) code with rate R = lnM
T
we have
R ≤
1
T (1− Pe)
(
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 |Z
T
0 ) + I(U ;Z
T
0 ) +H(Pe)
)
. (35)
Proof: Let Uˆ = DT (Y T0 ) denote the output of the decoder at the legitimate receiver, so that Pe = Pr(U 6= Uˆ).
We then have the following sequence of identities
RT = lnM = H(U)
(a)
= H(U |Y T0 ) + I(U ;Y
T
0 )
(b)
≤ H(U |Uˆ) + I(U ;Y T0 )
(c)
≤ H(Pe) + Pe lnM + I(U ;Y
T
0 ), (36)
the equality (a) follows from Wyner’s lemma and the inequality (c) is an application of Fano’s inequality. For the
inequality (b), since U → Y T0 → Uˆ is a Markov chain we deduce that6 I(U, Y T0 ) ≥ I(U, Uˆ ). Now by invoking
Wyner’s lemma again it follows that H(U |Y T0 ) ≤ H(U |Uˆ ).
From Kolmogorov’s formula (see Lemma 3.2 in [29]) we have7
I(U ;Y T0 , Z
T
0 ) = I(U ;Y
T
0 ) + I(U ;Z
T
0 |Y
T
0 ), (37)
since U → Y T0 → ZT0 is a Markov chain we deduce that8 I(U ;ZT0 |Y T0 ) = 0. By applying Kolmogorov’s formula
again we obtain
I(U ;Y T0 ) = I(U ;Y
T
0 , Z
T
0 ) = I(U ;Z
T
0 ) + I(U ;Y
T
0 |Z
T
0 )
≤ I(U ;ZT0 ) + I(X
T
0 ;Y
T
0 |Z
T
0 ), (38)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that U → XT0 → Y T0 → ZT0 form a Markov chain. Combining this
last inequality with (c) and rearranging the terms yields the desired inequality.
6The data processing inequality extends to arbitrary random variables, see for instance Theorem 3.4 in [29].
7The definition of the conditional mutual information for arbitrary random variables can be found in [29].
8Refer to Lemma 3.1. in [29].
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Lemma 5. If E
∫ T
0 |Xt lnXt| <∞, then
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 |Z
T
0 ) = I(X
T
0 ;Y
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 ) (39)
Proof: Applying Kolmogorov’s formula twice gives
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 , Z
T
0 ) = I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 ) + I(X
T
0 ;Y
T
0 |Z
T
0 )
= I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 ) + I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 |Y
T
0 ). (40)
Since XT0 → Y T0 → ZT0 form a Markov chain, we have I(XT0 ;ZT0 |Y T0 ) = 0. Consequently we deduce that
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 ) = I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 ) + I(X
T
0 ;Y
T
0 |Z
T
0 ). (41)
The condition E
∫ T
0 |Xt lnXt| <∞ implies that I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 ) <∞ and it follows that I(XT0 ;Y T0 )− I(XT0 ;ZT0 ) =
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 |Z
T
0 ).
The goal of the upcoming lemmas is to prove that I(XT0 ;Y T0 |ZT0 ) ≤ TCs, where Cs is given by (10). We first
decompose I(XT0 ;Y T0 |ZT0 ) as follows
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 |Z
T
0 ) = I(X
T
0 ;Y
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 )
= I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ; Y˜
T
0 )
+ I(XT0 ; Y˜
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 ), (42)
where Y˜ T0 has been defined in (7). The next two lemmas will provide upper bounds on I(XT0 ;Y T0 )− I(XT0 ; Y˜ T0 )
and I(XT0 ; Y˜ T0 )− I(XT0 ;ZT0 ).
Lemma 6. If E
∫ T
0 |Xt lnXt| <∞, then
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ; Y˜
T
0 ) ≤∫ T
0
(
Ay
Az
(φz(E[Xt])− E[φz(Xt)])− (φy(E[Xt])− E[φy(Xt)])
)
dt, (43)
where φy(x) = (Ayx+ λy) ln(Ayx+ λy) and φz(x) has been defined above analogously.
Proof: Note first that [16], [30]
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 ) =
∫ T
0
(
E[φy(Xt)]− E[φy(E[Xt|F
t
Y ])]
)
dt, (44)
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and
I(XT0 ; Y˜
T
0 ) =
∫ T
0
(
E[χ(Xt)]− E[χ(E[Xt|F
t
Y˜
])]
)
dt, (45)
where χ(x) = (Ayx+ AyAz λz) ln(Ayx+
Ay
Az
λz). Consequently, using the fact that χ(x) = AyAz φz(x)+ ln(
Ay
Az
)(Ayx+
Ay
Az
λz) and after simplifications, we deduce the following
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ; Y˜
T
0 ) =
∫ T
0
(
E[φy(Xt)]− E[φy(E[Xt|F
t
Y ])]
)
dt
−
Ay
Az
∫ T
0
(
E[φz(Xt)]− E[φz(E[Xt|F
t
Y˜
])]
)
dt. (46)
Recall that Y˜ T0 = Y T0 + HT0 , where HT0 is a homogeneous Poisson process independent of (XT0 , Y T0 ). Clearly,
F t
Y˜
⊂ F tY ∨ F
t
H , with F tY ∨ F tH = σ(F tY ∪ F tH) being the smallest sigma-field containing F tY ∪ F tH . From the
independence of (XT0 , Y T0 ) from HT0 , using the law of redundant conditioning (see, e.g. [30, pp. 281-282]), we
deduce that
E[Xt|F
t
Y ∨ F
t
H ] = E[Xt|F
t
Y ] a.s. (47)
We can now establish the following sequence of identities
E[φz(E[Xt|F
t
Y ])]
(a)
= E[φz(E[Xt|F
t
Y ∨ F
t
H ])] (48)
(b)
= E[E[φz(E[Xt|F
t
Y ∨ F
t
H ])|F
t
Y˜
]] (49)
(c)
≥ E[φz(E[E[Xt|F
t
Y ∨ F
t
H ]|F
t
Y˜
])] (50)
(d)
= E[φz(E[Xt|F
t
Y˜
])], (51)
where (a) follows from (47), (b) follows from the smoothing property of the conditional expectation, (c) from
Jensen’s inequality applied to the convex function φz(·) and (d) from the fact that F tY˜ ⊂ F
t
Y ∨ F
t
H and the
smoothing property.
We deduce therefore that
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ; Y˜
T
0 ) ≤
∫ T
0
(
E[φy(Xt)]− E[φy(E[Xt|F
t
Y ])]
)
dt
−
Ay
Az
∫ T
0
(
E[φz(Xt)]− E[φz(E[Xt|F
t
Y ])]
)
dt. (52)
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A simple derivation shows that the function π(x) = φy(x)− AyAz φz(x) is convex as
π′′(x) =
Ay(λzAy − λyAz)
(Ayx+ λy)(Azx+ λz)
≥ 0. (53)
Now invoking again Jensen’s inequality we obtain that
E[π(E[Xt|F
t
Y ])] ≥ π(E[E[Xt|F
t
Y ]]) = π(E[Xt]). (54)
Using this last inequality and after rearranging the terms we obtain the desired result, i.e.,
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ; Y˜
T
0 ) ≤
∫ T
0
(E[φy(Xt)]− φy(E[Xt])) dt
−
Ay
Az
∫ T
0
(E[φz(Xt)]− φz(E[Xt])) dt. (55)
An alternative proof of this lemma using the link provided in [24] between the MMSE and the mutual information
in Poisson channels is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 7. If E
∫ T
0 |Xt lnXt| <∞, then
I(XT0 ; Y˜
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 )
≤ (
Ay
Az
− 1)
∫ T
0
(E[φz(Xt)]− φz(E[Xt]))dt (56)
Proof: Recall that ZT0 was obtained from Y˜ T0 by thinning with erasure probability 1 − AzAy . Let the process
Z˜T0 denote those points that were erased, hence we have that Z˜T0 is a doubly stochastic Poisson process with
instantaneous rate (Ay −Az)Xt +(AyAz − 1)λz . Moreover Z
T
0 and Z˜T0 are independent given XT0 . We proceed with
the proof of the lemma by showing that the following inequality holds
I(XT0 ; Y˜
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 ) ≤ I(X
T
0 ; Z˜
T
0 ). (57)
Indeed, notice first that XT0 → (ZT0 , Z˜T0 )→ Y˜ T0 is a Markov chain, hence from the data processing inequality we
deduce that
I(XT0 ; Y˜
T
0 ) = I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 + Z˜
T
0 ) ≤ I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 , Z˜
T
0 ). (58)
Consider now two partitions of Ω, QZ = {Ai}N1i=1 ⊆ FTZ and QZ˜ = {Bj}
N2
j=1 ⊆ F
T
Z˜
. Define two discrete random
variables D and D˜ on Ω as follows D(ω) = i if ω ∈ Ai and D˜(ω) = j if ω ∈ Bj . The mutual information
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I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 , Z˜
T
0 ) can be computed as [29]
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 , Z˜
T
0 ) = sup
QZ,QZ˜
I(XT0 ;D, D˜), (59)
where the supremum is taken over all such partitions of Ω. We proceed to prove (57) as follows
I(XT0 ;D, D˜)
(a)
= H(D, D˜)−H(D, D˜|XT0 )
(b)
≤ H(D) +H(D˜)−H(D, D˜|XT0 )
(c)
= H(D) +H(D˜)−H(D|XT0 )−H(D˜|X
T
0 )
(d)
= I(D;XT0 ) + I(D˜;X
T
0 ), (60)
where (a) follows from Lemma 3 (Wyner’s lemma) applied to the random variable (D, D˜), (d) is a also a direct
instance of this lemma. The inequality (b) is the independence bound on the entropy (which holds here since the
random variables D and D˜ are discrete). The equality (c) results from the fact that D and D˜ are conditionally
independent given XT0 , indeed D ∈ FTZ whereas D˜ ∈ FTZ˜ and F
T
Z and FTZ˜ are conditionally independent given
FTX . Consequently we have
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 , Z˜
T
0 ) = sup
QZ ,QZ˜
I(XT0 ;D, D˜)
≤ sup
QZ ,QZ˜
(I(XT0 ;D) + I(X
T
0 ; D˜))
= I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 ) + I(X
T
0 ; Z˜
T
0 ). (61)
Combining the last inequality with (58) we deduce that9
I(XT0 ; Y˜
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 ) ≤ I(X
T
0 ; Z˜
T
0 ). (62)
Now using Lemma 2 we have
I(XT0 ; Z˜
T
0 ) ≤
∫ T
0
(E[ϕ(Xt)]− ϕ(E[Xt]))dt, (63)
where
ϕ(x) = ((Ay −Az)x+ (
Ay
Az
− 1)λz) ln((Ay −Az)x+ (
Ay
Az
− 1)λz). (64)
9Note that since E
∫
T
0
|Xt lnXt| <∞, then I(XT0 ;ZT0 ) <∞ and hence the inequality is well defined.
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Notice now that
ϕ(x) = (
Ay
Az
− 1)φz(x) + (
Ay
Az
− 1) ln(
Ay
Az
− 1)(Azx+ λz). (65)
Plugging this identity in the inequality above, the linear term in x disappears and we are left with the inequality
presented in the lemma.
An alternative proof of this lemma using the link provided in [24] between the MMSE and the mutual information
in Poisson channels is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 3. If E
∫ T
0 |Xt lnXt| <∞, then
1
T
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 |Z
T
0 ) ≤ Cs (66)
Proof: Combining (42) and the result of the two previous lemmas yields
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 ) ≤
∫ T
0
(E[K(Xt)]−K(E[Xt]))dt, (67)
where K(x) = φy(x)− φz(x). A straightforward computation shows that
K ′′(x) =
AzAy(Ay −Az)x+ λzA
2
y − λyA
2
z
(Ayx+ λy)(Azx+ λz)
, (68)
since Ay ≥ Az and λzA2y ≥ λyAyAz ≥ λyA2z we deduce that K ′′(x) ≥ 0. Moreover due to the assumption that
at least one of the inequalities (5) or (6) is strict, we conclude that K ′′(x) > 0 (for x > 0) and K(·) is strictly
convex.
Notice now that we have
1
T
∫ T
0
(E[K(Xt)]−K(E[Xt]))dt
(a)
≤ max
0≤α≤1
(
max
ρ:
∫
1
0
xρ(dx)=α
∫ 1
0
K(x)ρ(dx)−K(α)
)
(b)
= max
0≤α≤1
(αK(1) + (1− α)K(0) −K(α)) , (69)
where (a) follows from fixing E[Xt] = α and maximizing over all distributions ρ(x) on [0, 1] with mean α. Equality
(b) follows from the convexity of K(·) (refer to [16] and [31]), i.e., the maximizing distribution ρ puts all the mass
on the extremes {0, 1} and since the mean is α, the maximizing ρ assigns the mass α to 1 and 1− α to 0.
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The maximization of the last term shows that the optimal α∗ is the unique solution to the equation
K ′(α∗) = K(1)−K(0),
which, after some algebraic manipulations, gives that α∗ is the solution to (11). The existence of α∗ follows simply
from the mean value theorem, whereas the uniqueness is a consequence of the strict monotonicity of K ′(x).
Consequently, the following is true
1
T
∫ T
0
(E[K(Xt)]−K(E[Xt]))dt
≤ α∗K(1) + (1− α∗)K(0) −K(α∗)
= α∗(Ay −Az) + ln
(
λ
λy
y
λλzz
)
+ ln
(
(Azα
∗ + λz)
λz
(Ayα∗ + λy)λy
)
. (70)
This fact when combined with (67) gives the result announced in the theorem.
We are now in a position to prove the converse theorem.
Theorem 4 (Converse). If Rs is an achievable secrecy rate then Rs ≤ Cs.
Proof: Since the secrecy rate Rs is achievable then for all 0 < ǫ < 12 and sufficiently large T , there exists an
(M,T ) code such that lnM
T
≥ Rs − ǫ, Pe ≤ ǫ and 1T I(U ;Z
T
0 ) ≤ ǫ. Hence we have
Rs ≤
lnM
T
+ ǫ
(a)
≤
1
T (1− Pe)
(
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 |Z
T
0 ) + I(U ;Z
T
0 ) +H(Pe)
)
+ ǫ
(b)
≤
1
1− Pe
(
Cs +
I(U ;ZT0 )
T
+
H(Pe)
T
)
+ ǫ
(c)
≤
1
1− ǫ
(
Cs + ǫ+
H(ǫ)
T
)
+ ǫ, (71)
where inequality (a) follows from Lemma 4, inequality (b) from Theorem 3 and inequality (c) from the properties
of the code. Now since ǫ is arbitrary, letting ǫ→ 0 yields Rs ≤ Cs.
V. RATE-EQUIVOCATION REGION
In this section we turn our attention to the rate equivocation region of the degraded Poisson wiretap channel. The
level of ignorance of the eavesdropper about the transmitted message U will be measured here by the normalized
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equivocation given by
∆T =
H(U |ZT0 )
H(U)
. (72)
Definition A rate-equivocation pair (R, d) is said to be achievable for the Poisson wiretap channel if for all ǫ > 0
and all sufficiently large T , there exists an (M,T ) code such that
lnM
T
≥ R− ǫ
Pe ≤ ǫ
H(U |ZT0 )
H(U)
≥ d− ǫ (73)
The following theorem gives the rate equivocation region for the degraded Poisson Wiretap channel.
Theorem 5. The rate-equivocation region is the set of all rate-equivocation pairs (R, d) for which there exits some
α ∈ [0, 1] such that
Rd ≤ α ln
(
(Ay + λy)
Ay+λy
(Az + λz)Az+λz
)
+ (1− α) ln
(
λ
λy
y
λλzz
)
− ln
(
(Ayα+ λy)
Ayα+λy
(Azα+ λz)Azα+λz
)
(74)
R ≤ α ln
(
(Ay + λy)
Ay+λy
)
+ (1− α) ln
(
λλyy
)
− ln
(
(Ayα+ λy)
Ayα+λy
)
(75)
d ≤ 1 (76)
To ease the notations, using the functions K(·) and φy(·), we can rewrite the two first inequalities as Rd ≤
αK(1) + (1− α)K(0) −K(α) and R ≤ αφy(1) + (1− α)φy(0)− φy(α).
Proof: The main ingredients needed to prove this theorem has been already used to obtain the secrecy capacity.
More specifically, for the achievability proof we will use stochastic encoding combined with Wyner codes for the
Poisson channel, and for the converse we will use the key inequality (67) established by Lemma 6 and 7.
A. Direct result
Note first that for a fixed rate R, if the rate equivocation pair (R, d) is achievable then the pair (R, d˜) is achievable
for all 0 ≤ d˜ ≤ d. Hence, in order to establish the direct result, it is enough to prove that any rate-equivocation
pair (R, d) satisfying Rd = αK(1) + (1 − α)K(0) −K(α), R ≤ αφy(1) + (1 − α)φy(0) − φy(α) and d ≤ 1 for
some α ∈ [0, 1] is achievable.
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Define
Ru = αφu(1) + (1− α)φu(0)− φu(α), u ∈ {y, z}. (77)
Let ǫ > 0 be arbitrary (small enough) and let R = Ry−Rz−ǫR
d
with d ≤ 1 and R ≤ αφy(1)+(1−α)φy(0)−φy(α).
The message U to be transmitted is selected uniformly randomly from U = {1, ...,M} with M = eRT . Define
My = e
(Ry−3ǫ
R
2
)T and, following the steps described for the achievability of the secrecy capacity, construct the
Wyner code C = W(T,My, αMy). Partition this code arbitrarily into M smaller subcodes, i.e., C = ∪Mi=1Ci. The
cardinality of each subcode Ci will be equal to Mz = MyM = e
(Ry−R−3ǫ
R
2
)T
. Notice that with this choice of
parameters we have
1
T
lnMz = Ry −R− 3ǫ
R
2
≤ Ry −Rd− 3ǫ
R
2
= Rz − ǫ
R
2
. (78)
The probability of error Pe of the legitimate receiver can be made less than ǫ because the Wyner code C can achieve
the rate Ry .
The equivocation of the code C can be lower bounded using the same steps used to established the upper bound
on I(U ;ZT0 ) for the secrecy capacity, as follows
∆T =
H(U |ZT0 )
H(U)
= 1−
I(U ;ZT0 )
RT
(79)
(a)
≥ 1−
Rz
R
+
1
RT
lnMz −
1
RT
(H(δ) + δ lnMz) (80)
= 1−
Rz
R
+
Ry −R− 3ǫ
R
2
R
−
1
RT
(H(δ) + δ lnMz) (81)
≥ d−
ǫ
2
−
1
RT
H(δ)− δ(
Rz
R
−
ǫ
2
). (82)
In the above, inequality (a) follows from (31) and δ = 1
M
∑M
m=1 δm where δm is the probability of error for the
code Cm (1 ≤ m ≤M ) with the (optimal) decoder described previously.
As was discussed before, the term 1
RT
H(δ) + δ(Rz
R
− ǫ2) can be made less than
ǫ
2 for T large enough, which
means that
∆T =
H(U |ZT0 )
H(U)
≥ d− ǫ. (83)
This establishes that the rate-equivocation pair (R, d) is achievable.
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B. Converse
For every (M,T ) code with rate RT = lnMT and equivocation ∆T =
H(U |ZT0 )
H(U) we have
TRT∆T = H(U |Z
T
0 ) = H(U)− I(U ;Z
T
0 )
= H(U |Y T0 ) + I(U ;Y
T
0 )− I(U ;Z
T
0 )
≤ H(U |Uˆ) + I(U ;Y T0 |Z
T
0 )
≤ H(Pe) + Pe lnM + I(X
T
0 ;Y
T
0 |Z
T
0 ). (84)
From Lemma 6 and 7 (cf. (67)) we have that
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 |Z
T
0 ) ≤
∫ T
0
(E[K(Xt)]−K(E[Xt]))dt. (85)
Consequently, we deduce that
RT∆T ≤
H(Pe) + Pe lnM
T
+
1
T
∫ T
0
(E[K(Xt)]−K(E[Xt]))dt (86)
≤
H(Pe) + Pe lnM
T
+ αK(1) + (1− α)K(0) −K(α), (87)
with α = 1
T
∫ T
0 E[Xt]dt and the last inequality follows from the convexity of the function K(·). Note that since
0 ≤ Xt ≤ 1 it follows that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Similarly, we have that
RT =
H(U)
T
=
1
T
H(U |Y T0 ) +
1
T
I(U ;Y T0 )
≤
1
T
H(U |Uˆ ) +
1
T
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )
(a)
≤
1
T
(H(Pe) + Pe lnM) +
1
T
∫ T
0
(E[φy(Xt)]− φy(E[Xt]))dt
(b)
≤
H(Pe) + Pe lnM
T
+ αφy(1) + (1− α)φy(0)− φy(α), (88)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality and Lemma 2 and (b) follows from the convexity of the function φy(·).
Assume now that (R, d) is achievable, then for all 0 < ǫ < 12 and all sufficiently large T , there exists an (M,T )
code such that RT ≥ R − ǫ, Pe ≤ ǫ and ∆T ≥ d− ǫ. By definition ∆T ≤ 1, and hence d ≤ 1 + ǫ and in light of
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the previous inequalities we have
(R − ǫ)(d − ǫ) ≤
H(ǫ) + ǫ lnM
T
+ αK(1) + (1− α)K(0) −K(α) (89)
(R − ǫ) ≤
H(ǫ) + ǫ lnM
T
+ αφy(1) + (1− α)φy(0) − φy(α). (90)
Now since ǫ is arbitrary, letting ǫ→ 0 yields the desired result.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Motivated by the practical advantages of optical communication over RF for secure communication, we have
derived the secrecy capacity and characterized the rate-equivocation region of the degraded Poisson wiretap channel.
Several interesting problems remain open and deserve further investigation. One is the non-degraded Poisson
Wiretap channel. One can imagine a situation in which the eavesdropper is equipped with a powerful detector
characterized by a negligible dark current (i.e., λz = 0). If the detector of the legitimate receiver has a higher
received power from the transmitter but is more prone to dark current, then the channel will not be degraded. This
is a practically-important situation but is not covered by the results of this paper.
Another issue that we have not considered is fading. Indeed, for wireless optical communications, atmospheric
turbulence can induce random fluctuations of the intensity of the transmitted light beam [23], which creates fading
and complicates secure communication. Note, however, that this fading is fundamentally different from multipath
fading and is more manageable from the standpoint of achieving secure communication.
MIMO Poisson channels have received some interest lately (see [32] and the references therein), and as has been
done in the Gaussian setting, it would be interesting to see the impact of having multiple antennas on the secrecy
capacity in the Poisson regime.
We believe that the results derived in this paper and the tools used to derive them could be used to address these
problems.
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APPENDIX A
AN MMSE PROOF FOR LEMMA 6
In this first appendix, we provide an alternative proof for Lemma 6. This proof uses the link established in [24]
between the MMSE and the mutual information in Poisson channels. Note first that since E
∫ T
0 |Xt lnXt| < ∞,
we have that I(XT0 ;PT0 (AyXT0 + λ)) is differentiable and Theorem 3 in [24] states that
d
dλ
I(XT0 ;P
T
0 (AyX
T
0 + λ)) =∫ T
0
E{ln(AyXt + λ)− ln〈AyXt + λ〉T }dt. (91)
Notice now that
I(XT0 ; Y˜
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ;Y
T
0 ) =∫ λy+λ˜
λy
d
dλ
I(XT0 ;P
T
0 (AyX
T
0 + λ))dλ. (92)
Therefore
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ; Y˜
T
0 ) =∫ λy+λ˜
λy
(∫ T
0
(E{ln〈AyXt + λ〉T }−E{ln(AyXt + λ)})dt
)
dλ. (93)
Since the function ln(·) is concave, using Jensen’s inequality and the iterative conditioning property we have
E{ln〈AyXt + λ〉T } ≤ lnE[〈AyXt + λ〉T ] = ln(AyE[Xt] + λ).
Making use of this inequality and the fact that λy + λ˜ = AyAz λz we deduce that
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ; Y˜
T
0 ) ≤∫ T
0
(∫ Ay
Az
λz
λy
ln(AyE[Xt] + λ)dλ−E{
∫ Ay
Az
λz
λy
ln(AyXt + λ)dλ}
)
dt, (94)
where we have also invoked Fubini’s theorem to make the necessary exchanges between the integrals and the
expectation operator. The desired inequality is then obtained after some algebraic manipulations using the elementary
identity ∫
ln(Ayx+ λ)dλ = (Ayx+ λ) ln(Ayx+ λ)− λ. (95)
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APPENDIX B
AN MMSE PROOF FOR LEMMA 7
Here we provide an alternative proof for Lemma 7. For ease of notations define Wt = AyXt + AyAz λz . Using
Theorem 4 in [24] we obtain that
d
dα
I(W T0 ;P
T
0 (αW
T
0 )) =
∫ T
0
E[Wt ln(αWt)]dt−
∫ T
0
E[E[Wt|P
T
0 (αW
T
0 )] ln(E[αWt|P
T
0 (αW
T
0 )])]dt
=
∫ T
0
E[Wt lnWt]dt−
∫ T
0
E[E[Wt|P
T
0 (αW
T
0 )] ln(E[Wt|P
T
0 (αW
T
0 )])]dt, (96)
where the second equality is obtained after some simplifications using the identity E[E[Wt|PT0 (αW T0 )]] = E[Wt].
Now by the convexity of the function C(x) = x ln(x), Jensen’s inequality gives
E[C(E[Wt|P
T
0 (αW
T
0 )])] ≥ C(E[E[Wt|P
T
0 (αW
T
0 )]])
= C(E[Wt]). (97)
It follows therefore that
d
dα
I(W T0 ;P
T
0 (αW
T
0 )) ≤
∫ T
0
E[Wt lnWt]dt−
∫ T
0
E[Wt] lnE[Wt]dt. (98)
Clearly we have that I(W T0 ;PT0 (αW T0 )) = I(XT0 ;PT0 (αW T0 )). Also we have that Y˜ T0 = PT0 (W T0 ) and ZT0 =
PT0 (
Az
Ay
W T0 ). Consequently
I(XT0 ; Y˜
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 ) =
∫ 1
Az
Ay
d
dα
I(W T0 ;P
T
0 (αW
T
0 ))dα. (99)
Using the previous inequality, we conclude that
I(XT0 ; Y˜
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 ) ≤
∫ 1
Az
Ay
(∫ T
0
E[Wt lnWt]dt−
∫ T
0
E[Wt] lnE[Wt]dt
)
dα
= (1−
Az
Ay
)
(∫ T
0
E[(AyXt +
Ay
Az
λz) ln(AyXt +
Ay
Az
λz)]dt
−
∫ T
0
(AyE[Xt] +
Ay
Az
λz) ln(AyE[Xt] +
Ay
Az
λz)dt
)
. (100)
After some simplifications, the last inequality gives the desired result, i.e.,
I(XT0 ; Y˜
T
0 )− I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 ) ≤ (
Ay
Az
− 1)
∫ T
0
(E[φz(Xt)]− φz(E[Xt])) dt. (101)
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